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El! CmIS IN U. S. DEFENSE 
By Klaus Knorr 
* * & & * * * * * * * * *  
E VEN  bel lore the sputniks began .to whiz around the earth, the Ame6~8n people had good cause to ask whether their ddellse &Fort wm sdcient - 
for reasbnable safety. Year after year, the Russiank had been surprising the 
West wi& the speed at which they improved their military teohnology. The 
Soviet h i o n  developed fission and fusion bombs, +andnmo&m fighters and 
bombing planes, more rapidly than had been anticipated. In 1957, the RUS- 
suddenly moved ahead of the United* States in the' successful testihg of 
ballistic &iles and, of course, ia the fielding of ear&'-Wa. These were 
not isolited scientifio and techno10gic:al dtchi&m& The R-ans are at 
least as advanced qs the United staieS in the oonstructiaa of ayhtrons and 
electronic computers, and they lead in &dwelomentt .of :@apt jet airliners. 
While they seem to lag far behind in durable consumers' goods,.they appear to 
ba doing exceedingly well with projects onlwhick they. concentrata 
Until the sputniks, Washington had responded to Soviet teChnologica1 ad- 
.oimcea by re855urjng the .colmtry that, as before, the United States held a 
decisive*military edge over the ,Q$I$.. Daring the summer of 1957, at the very 
time when thg Govewemt had- leaned. of tlre swccessful testing of an Inter- 
continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) in Soviet Russia, the Department of 
Zkfense launched a frantic ef fokb &uce the rate of military spending and 
to pare the manpower of the Armed Services. This ruthless exercise in re- 
trenchment was avowedly undertaken f~ m d c  masons. Insistent demands 
for reduoing the ~ e d e r i l  budget to permit a cut in Federal taxes, a cam- 
paign to diminish inflationary pressures, and the fi* reluctance to permit 
Federal expenditures even temporarily to pierce thediktutory ceiling of $275 
billion on the national debt-all these provided the motive power behind the 
economy drive. When Moscow announced the wccesfd laundhg of an 
ICBM, our leaders observed that it would take the Rmeians several years be- 
fore the experimental design would be mass-produced as an operational 
weapon. It occurred to few commentators, at &st, to ask the obvious ques- 
tion: If the Russians have beaten us in the race to produce an experimental , 
model, are they not also likely to beat us in the production of operational 
ICBM's? 
This complacent mood, which allowed repeated danger signals to be played 
down, was caught poignantly in a New Yorker cartoon showing a middle-aged, 
well-to-do lady remarking to her spouse: "Well, this has been a good week 
for everybody. The Russians got the ICBM and we got the Edsel." In view 
of,gathering widen= of Soviet anrm p&iency, it .should not ham repired 
the sputniks to disturb this mood. But it did take the earth satellite to shatter 
8. The sputniks lcould not ,h denied bi ignored. They shocked 'the k'berican 
public, and through it, the nation's leadership which, as before; was at first 
disposed to counter any alarmist sestihenb with soothing r e a s s w w e  At 
la&, in the middle of November, Washington admittad officially that the 
United States was lagging two or &.re years behind the Soviet Union in the 
missiles fieldk % 
I Shting tbe first eAh w&di&ihto its orbit was more than a spleddid 
scientific and technical achievement. What dismayed many Western e~perEs 
was not so much that the Russians were first than that the weight of the 
Russian  moons'.',,^^ m y  times greatmS and th& orbit farther out in 
space, ihan thoseJd~-be pjecaed Anmic81f satdlite. Them facts have several 
meanings. The sputniks c o n h e d  that the USSR had developed rocket en- 
g b i ~ ~  of p~werful thruet, and Wer el&~ronic g&hce system, &an 
had thq#~&?ait&,States-a~lid~ thk is of inmdiak impartance in long-range 
-missiaetdevdo-t; Mote important, they dispelled a persistent illasion about 
\ R ~ ~ w ~ r i ~ r i t y .  in O ~ i e n ~ e  and en@jnm&g, and i o r d . t h e  West to die 
oerd an' absokte image bf Soviet capabilitya Along with other evidence, the 
 SO&^ earth satdlites; discredit the belief thdt the vast manpower resouM,es 
of the C~mmuniat world con be balanced by the technologid superiority of 
the W d .  
.Even though the overall Russian perfomhce in all scientific fields, d- 
tan and civilian, ie still appreciably behind the American, the gap is closing 
and tbe Soviet Union. b spring no e.fEort to dose it in lureas important to 
dlitary pa- It is on the traditi01m1 belitf in Soviet backwar&ess ha t  
m u ~ h  of the defense planning in the West has been based, and that many 
cpountrb~ plaed their hope in the ahilty of the United States to protect the 
free-. natiins. The apparent Soviet - mpttlr~$. :of the technological initiative 
mmwd to reveal-to eoaie newt.td.4~ well rs..&ed .nations that their security 
was f-dd on W a n .  - 
-8 the &ties generated in the ;United States by the Soviet moons are 
fat: from groan- this readive s n 4  is, unfortunately, focusing on h e r i -  
can -Mi p&qgces~ to the vktua1 excluaioe of 0th- components of om 
milimy pb&u1:b hdeed, them is a grave do-r that-increased expendims 
on missiles will be off* in s~mepwt at 1- 'by- further reductioa of tbis 
c(~~1trf~ 's  &i&ty: myduct limitd ware. What je urgently needed at this 
tinbe isnot a hawtic imitative respoase on the part of the United States, but a 
searching reappraisal of the entire d e f w  effort. Five basic questions- 
inter-related but s e p m & b l 4 d d  h d  focua to, this reappraisd: 
*-What is tbe world military situation which the United States must beet 
by its own military stature? , 
What kind of d i t a r y  posture, and what 'kind of grand.strategy, are re- 
. cfuir:d. by this situation? . .. I . . 
: What a n  the mats of an adequate defense &0& and how much of a bur- 
den-can the American economy stand? 
Is the American defense elfort handicapped-not only* by an bsufEciacy 
of resources but also by the inefficiency with which the allocated resources are 
actually employed? 
Finally, how much priority does' the American public want to give the 
provisions for national security? 
In taking up these questions, the following discussion is necessarily selec- 
tive. It focuses on what are perceived to be some of the major issues confront- 
ing the American defense effort, and i t  ignores such important problems as 
the NATO relationship, international arms control, and the American position 
in waging the political, economic and diplomatic struanle known as the 
Cold War- 
Soviet Hostility: The starting point of any analysis of the world military 
situation is the implacable hostility of the Soviet Union to the liberal, demo- 
cratic West. The Russian rulers continue to afhrm their belief that the Com- 
munist system will eventually engulf the world, that this expansion is part of 
an inexorable historical process, and that it is their mission to abet and exploit 
the forces of revolution. This does not mean necessarily that they expect to 
conquer in war. Thus far, the record of Soviet Russia has been mostly one of 
military caution. The Kremlin may hope that the military power at its com- 
mand will neutralize that of the West, and prefer to expand the sway of Com- 
munist rule piecemeal and chiefly through diplomacy, propaganda, subversion 
and-in the economically underdeveloped world especially-through eco- 
nomia help and the attraction of the Soviet model for rapid industrialization. 
The West, however, has no assurance that the USSR will stick to "peace- 
ful" but highly competitive coexistence. The Soviet record also shows that 
Moscow is far from averse to using military force, or the threat of military 
action, whenever doing so seems to involve little risk to its own security. 
During the Suez crisis of 1956; again in response to the American policy of 
sending atomic weapons to the NATO countries; and, finally, as part of 
Moscow's stand in favor of Syrian "independence" in the fall of 1957, the 
USSR uttered sharp threats of atomic and rocket retaliation. It is precisely in 
order to deny the Soviet bloc the opportunity for military blackmail and con- 
quest that the West must build up sufficient counter-force. \ 
We need not assume that Soviet hostility and imperialism are forever 
inevitable. Like any other society, Soviet Russia is subject to change. But 
dependable change in Soviet behavior will be slow in coming, and short-run 
changes must be discounted. Mere protestations of peaceful intentions are 
likely to express no more than a tactical maneuver. Mere changes in the per- 
sonalities of the leaders will mean little as long as the present system remains 
essentially intact. Nor can much store be set on any sudden crisis of leader- 
ship, for internal weakness may lead to a sharpening rather than an abatement 
of external aggressiveness. Dependable change in Soviet foreign policy can 
result only from profound changes in Soviet institutions ind attitudes, and 
such changes take time to mature. Even if we perceive present trends indicat- 
k g  such basic change, we must assume for the time being that these trends 
are ten-, subject to abrupt reversal, and of uncertain consumnation. Much 
as we hope for such changes, we mnst assume, to be on the safe side in so 
momentous a matter, that intense hostility to the West is still central to Soviet 
motivations and may continue to be for a long time. 
From the military point of view, the United States and the Soviet Union 
dwarf all other countria in military power. At present, only the United States 
can check the thermonuclear air power of the USSR. Nor does any country 
dong the long periphsry of the Sin&* bloc possess conventional forces 
strong enough to resist for long a d-sd Soviet-mounted offermsive. If the 
Soviet Union, whether acting directly or through proxy, is to be stopped from 
conquering outlyiq areas by local aggression, the non-Comunist world 
must o r g h  ,sufficient counter-force; and it has become increasingly clear 
that only the United States can be effective as the organizer and has resources 
sizable enough for operating militarily over far distances, 
Soviet Strength: If the United States needs military power to protect its 
own territories as well as forestall a development condemning it to live ever 
more precariously in a shrinking .island within a spreading Communist world, 
its military effort must obviously be related to Soviet military capabilites (p& 
marily Busaia's but secondarily, and over time increasingly, those of the entire 
Sino-Soviet bloc) for attacking, or threatening to attack, the United States 
and other eritical areas in the non-Communist world. What kinds of forces are 
required, and how powerful should these forces be? Sinm, in both respects, 
American needs are governed largely by the structure and scale of the Soviet 
military effort, it is important to notice .the wealth of resourcemanpower; 
economic, scientific and administrativewhich the Soviet Union is now 
devoting to the buildup of its military power and is likely to devote to' it in 
the future. 
Indisputably, the ~bviet leader6 give a hi& and firm priority to military 
effort, and the totahrian system of gove-ent puts them in a position to 
impose this priority on Soviet society. Their sumssive plans for industriaha- 
tion, showing a major emphasis on &ivy industry, have always been directed 
in large part to providing the industrial underpinning for military strength. 
Although Russia's Gross National Product is at present only somewhat over a 
third of the h t k n  GNP, the Soviet Union is believed to spend a larger pro- 
portion of it-pexhaps half again as l a r g m n  defense than does the United 
Statea. While the Soviet defense budget may be less in absolute amount than 
the American, Buseia gets a great deal more military worth out of &ch 
defense dollar than the United States- She spends far less on pay, subsistence 
and safety of military personnel; at the expense of consumer goods industries, 
she empb JS her most productive resources-the best workers, managers and 
scientists, and the best equipped factories-in the defense sector of the econ- 
omy; a d  she gives that sector overriding priority in the dimibutioa of mrce  
materiels. Hence, with a far smaller national income, the real resources 
d16aed to defense by the USSR may fall little short of the American docation. 
In 1957, the GNP of the USSR was growing at an estimated rate of about 
7 per cent a year, compared with somewhat leas than 4 per cent in the United 
Stataa It is probable that the Soviet rate of economic growth will slow down 
soamhat in the future, as it has-in recent years, and it is possible that the 
Kremlin will find it politically e e t  to do appreciably more for the Soviet 
consumer than it has done in the pest The resulting pressures would reduce 
the ease with which further resources cnn be relased for use in the*ntilitary 
s e ~ t ~ r .  the 0 t h  hand, U B ~ ~  the soviet rate of economic growth slows 
dowa sdwtantiaIly and soon, a d  u a h  CO-m can make their demands 
a great deel mom &6ctive politicany tlrm they hawe so far, the USSR may 
divert a imm~sing v o b e  of r e m u m  to the military sector, and 
&as in- th p m e  exerted on the United S t a b  and its allies. As 
Long as hsia'd sate of economic growth remains higher &an the American, 
sbe can maialia roughly the pr-t proportions in the allocation of income 
to d e b ,  , i m w m  and consumption. arid t h s  eqand milaarg expendi- 
b r a  w& at tbe s ~ m a  time diverting more to her conswlzers. 
-Shoe the milit- race may be to the techndogicaIly swift, it is worth 
thm factors which may enable the Sodet Union to d id this area 
a 
Ccmmnunist leaders are fully aware that wexre living in e scien- 
tific age. They are firmly dedicated to exploring the endlessi scieintific &ontier, 
md b y  are spinkg oo eBort to multiply the numbers of their scienfists and 
aml t~ improve their training. There Is an impressive array of mi- 
d ' ~  to ~phich this Soviet effort has in recent y a m  wrpassed that 
&.the U& S t a b  . 
%C&O dertljonm nmm the wisdom of the Nszo Yorker-whide 
Aneerieam brsios .ad talent an, direrted hrgelp to the developnzent and mer- 
c h m q  .of y- and the a t i r e  mge of camp' goods and servkm, 
the R d m  put. the. beat af their aompralile momcegi to work on ICBM's, 
sputniks and the basic sciences that feed technological advance. With the balm 
ry p m  in the lomg run rathg in large part on the balame of 
$ecbbiogical capacity, this Soviet emphasis on science and 
ring :mi9 again entail increasing bilitary pressure on the West 
lRough ttaebjakn&@ base of the United § t a b  still exceeds the Russian, 
a~~;m+mt i jk  base .is becoming weaker than theirs. 
Pinely, :in. tbe &cbnt use of r a r c e s  allocated to the military sleetor, 
Ssvia emjoys the advantage aoctamg t~ the potential aggr&r (pro- 
dded it id c h r  to her, ar, it is tm us, && she in ,fact ocmpies that role and the 
~ i d l . S t a t e s  ?does not). Since cel(zuhted aggression is aaoaeptable in the 
~11:M Sbtes,'the Russians are able to explait the benefit of their initiative 
and imfonr, on the United States the far less ~fficient course of preparing for 
a .wider ranbe of eventualities. Whether they will actually fre able td do so 
i3epends, of mum, on many contingencies, including the conntsr mcamres 
of ahs Wd* 
WW- T . o k ~ l m  Technologioally, .the world military situation is 
dominated by themonuclern bombs and the various means for their delivery. 
+ This development Bas crudidly changed the military problem from what it 
was before and during the two world wars. The advent of these weapons 
systems has several important implicatims: 
There is the new and awesome dimension of destructiveness: It takes 
only a single hydrogen bomb in the lower megaton range to equal the total 
destructive power of all bombs dropped on all belligerents during World War 
II. Such a bomb releases about a thousand times more destructive power than 
the one dropped on Hiroshima. 
For purposes of all-out nuclear war, these new weapons systems have 
given the offensive a tremendous advantage over defense. At present, any 
known means of defense against nuclear-bomb carriers promise so low a rate 
of attrition that the aggressor can easily offset them by somewhat increasing 
his offensive capability. Better and reasonably cheap means of defense may 
be developed in the future but are not now in sight. While prospective losses 
to life and property could be cut by a considerable margin through dis- 
persal and, especially, the hardening of targets by means of shelters, feasible 
measures along these lines cannot avert catastrophic destruction through heat, 
blast and radiation. 
The speed and range of modern bomb carriers have vastly reduced the 
protective functions of time and space. The decieive blows in total war will fall 
within a matter of days or weeks. Defense through deterrence, therefore, must 
rest entirely on mobilized forces ready for instant retaliation. 
Finally, scientific and technological development in the weapons field is 
now taking place with a speed unequalled heretofore. This makes the military 
sector more voracious of highly skilled personnel and other scarce resources 
essential to research and development. It speeds up the rate at which new arms 
become obsolescent, thus increasing the military demand for industrial re- 
sources in general. And it also makes military planning more dScult and 
costly than in the past. In the first place, such planning must now provide 
. adequate defenses at different points in t imewith  the weapons of 1958 
probably no longer efficient in 1961, with those projected for 1961 possibly 
no longer efficient by 1964 and with a lead-time of several years before new 
weapons move from the drawing board or laboratory into serial production 
and operational use. In the second place, the competitive technological 
scramble has increased the factor of uncertainty. The weapons which a 
country plans to have available a few years hence must not only be better than 
the ones now in use; they must also be better, equal to, or an effective counter 
to the anas which a prospective enemy may have available at that future time. 
While it is difficult enough an intelligence task to ascertain and evaluate the 
weapons now in the hands of prospective opponents, it is obviously harder to 
speculate on the quantity of enemy weapons and their performance in the 
future. 
Types d War: In addition to uncertainty in arms technology, there is the 
further, related uncertainty about the types of warfare likely to occur in the 
future. There is general agreement that a massive and prolonged war of 
attrition fought with "conventional" weapons is highly improbable today; 
this kind of war implies war objectives of so high a priority (such as invasion 
and occupation) that the belligerents, if pressed hard by their opponenis, 
could not be expected to forego the use of more effective weapons in their 
arsenals. The unlikelihood of all-out thermonuclear war depends chiefly on 
- t b a L b a h ~  f nmtd,bsnor mid on the capscity of nations to aodd;rhe &xi- 
.dsartal. p#&ipitation. of thia type & war. . ( ,  , '  . I :  , . :, 
BV prd*, moat ampcrhs assume that-now ana in the :foriiee&k 
~bath.b-€kGlvSt . tss and the Soviet Uaion rtra able to in&t saw e:degme i 
of nuclear destmc~ion on the ather that n&&m d t q  will dd&&+f&& :j 
&a, udbi td  war. It ammot be taken far , & & & & ~ t ~ t y  
nor the mg&l i 
3 w E &  mu1d 'keep tbB pmWIte - : 
aaq~t&&ty-- But there !ia ho -! 
of e@&qr@ .a 116,t: &* 3 
a && 'by. tLe fmaoadl. die$;;o$*h 
raill d+6 to o ~ f s  6- bdmtry has a chstdng not only :an -iniECviU *. 
bat h - o n r s d d k 3 .  dm& .give stxiaim a -&a stmIige~%&er&;- thu! 
in the past, in keeping madmen from the controls.) NevmtMesq therird4t~b 
dsnC;er of t b m n m k  war breaking -8 .inadvertently. I; Tfxm,+. a 4 t d t d  
war -7 gxaduaU~ degenm~ into a total ahtest; bt'ia nrrtidm&iay lprmipi- 
hts an d a u t  attack fbr ftar thgt its opponent i s  about to do so ; - or, & a 
time of grave crisis, a false &tm may set off thb retaliatory meshbnism. 
The+ aapsoity to p e e  the racXidental outbreak of tatal war r* in each 
d o h  .on strength of motivation, which may be supplied by the fear of being 
itself subjected -to UaaCaeptabIe devastation; on the vulnerability of its mums 
for rediatiun, for d& HI &ect the fear of absorbing the first blow; on 
*btx~t.tive Competence, w, efktive twrang-ts tot. &Q d t a = y  
~dscisions; and on rsehnologicd cOmpetence,e.g., the abiiity to sift false fnw 
,Bbe &rms,. 
The mest i€Skp15 p ~ ~ s  ue psed by tBe possibility of limbed wars- 
&a w q  froin g u d a  d* aad minorpoliae actions'fmght 
omic wespna, to fairly hge and ptoIon& wars wkgd with * 
a%- md/a pre-miclear arms, bat st~pping; short of the strategic bombing 
of:* tbrmoandezu powers the-1- Clearly, s n c h ~ ~ e ~  on the use of 
weipms cam b-cffeotive only sr long as war aims are limited; for instme, 
u - l q  es wak aims:do not encompass the daisive defeat-.and occupation 
-d~~&ts side* Bqmnd this p r o p i o n ,  the problem of. limit& war .hss 
g k i ~  to lively ocmtrovers). Aecmding to one school of thought, any&hg 
name thrn a-brief and smrdl encounter in a peripheral area of wnftibt 
b &kelp. to and up H tot81 war. No do&, it is masonable to assumthat 
tbe larger and more p r d m g d  the limited war, the greater h g e r - , d  
total war. Yet the magnitude of the risk w d d  seem to be p r i m e  h 
.fanoti- of. the niutmal b d ~ c e  of terror. If cech paw- '6 ~ ~ ~ ~ O 1 h r  
.fagm wzmmpd11e lo- in total war, the. limits are M y  to stick. There 
h crlso a soh001 of thought amording to which limited wars fought with tacticil 
atomic .waapoas ate likely to progress to the udimited &age because of 
niml Wadh in setting and im& tihe limits Again, the presence of the 
risk mmt be conceded. But it a h  mma that the danger is in inverse propor- 
ti- t6 the f a  of botln2sides 06 becoming invdved in mliznid b s t i l i t i e a c ~  In 
either. event, .the .inherent rkk of an a c c i h k l  'breach ,a£ the limits o ~ g i n g ~ ~  
a:;:&: 3 
rset to a conflict depends chiefly OQ the &umsption with which the major 
.belligerents control their beha+r and cammunioate this r d t  to their - - . . . , . 
.' -: : - opponents. - . 
Even this very summary discuseion mve& thst, in many 
snt mili~ary eitoagun Men:@ radically from what nations 
.periods The ovanvhekning imptewidn is that we are face to,-facs with Un- 
certainty. There is techn010pjd m&ty; there is uncertainty h t  the 
shape of f-re was, and about the limits that om be imposed an them; there 
i a  uncertainty about how nations will react ta the opportunity praientd by 
a suddee, tbaugh temporary, teehnolo#cal ~upriority ,or, on the otber bd, 
to the danger pewnted by a sudden, even though t~mpo~ary, ~ t e c h n o 1 0 ~  
hferiority; and there is  uncertainty about how nations will react to nndear 
&eats to themselves or to -their allies. &questionably, the military 
faees a task of exacting cli3ic* as well ae frightful consequence. 
etqPP 2. The Americn Response 
5bia#F 
Amedcan A~t~m-ey: The main trend in American defense planning 
sib? 1945 has been a progressive cutback, interrupted only dGing tb% 
Korean War, in the country's  conventional^' (Lea, pre-atomic) forces and a 
growing concentration on strategic airpower. This policy was defended on the 
grounds (1) that the new nuclear weapons reduced the need for sheer masaes 
of military manpower--a component of strength in which the West was con- 
sidered unable to match the Soviet bloc, and (2) that economic reamns 
demanded selective concentration on the essential elements of d t m y  
-&* 
The policy, and the military doctrine in which it is rooted, looked persua- 
sive as long as this country possessed o monopoly or vast superiority in 
nuclear bombs. Even during this period of U.S. technological and military 
ascendancy, however, it wae doubtful whether ofEcia1 doctrine and policy 
made sdlicient allowance for limited-war situations in which it would have 
beea morally diilicult and politidy unwise to rely on nucletir arms. These 
and other doubts became far more pronounced as the decisive American 
.superiority in arms technology faded. 
By 1957, the United States was reforming a considerable proportion of its 
surface forces to fight limited nuclear war, but this shift did not suspend the 
trend toward clmmdm . a .  g military manpower. In order to keep defense 
expenditures from rising above the $38 billion-a-year limit, Defense Secretary 
Charles E Wilson ordered a reduction of 100,000 men by the end of the 
current fiscal year and referred to further plans for reducing the total strength 
of ths armed forces to 2.5 million men by July 1959. The cuts fell largely on 
. the U.S. Army. And, while Army and Navy units were being converted to 
atomic war, it was inevitable that American forced for conventional warfare 
ahrank persistently,. In the Navy, the last battleship was put in mothballs, and 
the Sixth Fleet, though possessing arespectable nuclear punch, had few planes 
and few men for engaging in conventional combat. At the &me time, two 
infantry divisions were to be inactivated by the Aimy and one of its armored 
divisions cut to a combat command, to leave a total of 15 divisions by the 
fall of 1957. 
Tbermonuelear Standoff: Whether this cutback in conventional strength, 
and the establishment of a small capability for fighting limited nuclear wars, 
give the United States a sufficient choice of military responses was bound to 
become a major question once the Russians were believed to be able, or nearly 
able, to threaten the United States with thermonuclear devastation. 
Whether a thermonuclear stand-off has now been reached may remain con- 
troversial. Modern weapons systems are so complex, future war conditions so 
uncertain, and intangible factors such as morale so unpredictable that it is 
most difficult to measure the present balance of thermonuclear airpower with 
any degree of precision. In all probability, United States airpower is today 
still superior to the Russian; and, despite Soviet advances in missiles, this 
condition may last another few years. But this relatively small and probably 
diminishing margin is not a consequential factor in the effective b a l a n c e  
and not just because the Kremlin is generally conceded the advantage of 
striking the first blow and thus the chance of destroying part of this country's 
. 
ability to retaliate. The decisive point is that, exact equality of power or not, 
the USSR has now or will soon have the capability of crippling the United 
States, inflicting tens of millions of civilian casualties and destroying or para- 
lyzing the bulk and heart of its economy. By the same token, if missile superi- 
ority will give the USSR a considerable edge over the retaliatory power of the 
United States within two or three years, this is not a matter of major conse- 
quence as long as this country retains the capacity, even after enduring a sur- 
prise attack, to cause unacceptable damage to the Russians. 
On either assumption, however, the United States must now review its 
grand strategy for defense, for it can no longer rest on a decisive superiority 
in thermonuclear airpower. In the new circumstances, limited war may well 
be the most likely form of future warfare. If a new strategy is called for, it 
will take several years before a revised policy is formulated and then trans- 
lated into the hardware and trained personnel of a readapted defense estab- 
lishment. In fact, the question of a grand strategy for the defense of the West 
must be considered an open one. No one choice is obviously right, and this 
very dilemma of uncertainty must, to a considerable extent, determine the 
+ :  
American response. 
Unquestionably, the United States must keep its strategic air arm capable 
of threatening the Soviet Union with unacceptable losses and thereby deter- 
ring the Kremlin from risking unlimited war. In view of recent Soviet prog- 
ress, this alone is no mean undertaking. Success wil l  not be guaranteed by 
clinging to the image of one's own scientific and technical leadership. The 
United States will have to speed up the development of its offensive delivery 
system and do much more than has thus far been necessary to protect the 
Strategic Air Command from a surprise attack. At the same time, it might be 
a gross error for the United States to put an overwhelming emphasis on over- 
coming the Russian missile lead or to gamble on the single attempt to recover 
decisive superiority over Soviet Russia in thermonuclear striking power. The 
question now is: How safe is it for this country to rely so largely on this single 
military instrument for protecting the various U.S. interests that may be at 
stake in a great variety of military and political circumstances? 
Massive Retaliation: According to the doctrine of massive retaliation 
announced by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in January 19% the 
United States was then ready to threaten the use of its nuclear airpower when- 
ever Communist local agg_r-=ion could not be thrown back by-$he forces of 
the attacked country (reinforced possibly by small contingents from the rest of 
the free world). So far as this policy contemplated the possible strategic bomb- 
ing of the Soviet Union, it rested on the decisive American superiority over 
the USSR in thermonuclear airpower. But as the Russians approach -the 
United States in this power, this policy becomes more dangerous and poseibly 
ineffective. It becomes more dangerous because the chances of unlimited war 
coming about inadvertently will inevitably increase with the number of times 
the United States is willing to move to the brink of all-out conflict. It becomes 
powibly ineffective because, facing the prospect of severe mutilation by the 
Soviet Air Force, the United States will become reluctant to risk its popula. 
tion and industrial centers in the face of minor aggressions, a change of atti- 
tude which would hardly surprise or escape the Kremlin. 
Under these circumstances, the Soviet Union may well feel tempted to create 
and exploit limited-war situations to a greater extent than in the past-unless 
the non-Communist countries find a means for deterring local wars other 
than by a threat of U.S. action which, while inflicting disastrous punishment 
on the aggressor, accepts roughly the same punishment for the United States 
itself. Secretary Dulles addressed himself to this problem in October 1957, 
in an article entitled "Challenge and Response in United' States Policy"' in 
Forekn Aflairs. He seemed to propose that, while in the past the threat of 
massive retaliation was needed to deter Soviet conventional aggression, in the 
future this deterrence will result from the West's new capacity in tactical 
nuclear weapons. However, Soviet Russia will hardly content herself with 
strategic airpower and conventional forces. She has already begun to equip 
herself for tactical nuclear war; and, though she may at present lag behind 
the United States in the development of a broad range of tactical nuclear 
weapons, it is surely an illusion to believe that she may not catch up in 
substantial measure. 
In that event, the United States cannot be sure of its ability to use tactical 
nuclear afms to deter local aggression or stop it in its tracks should it occur. 
Nor can it be sure, in that event, that local engagements can be kept small and 
short, unless the local balance of tactical nuclear power favors the defenders. 
As has been the case with conventional forces for some time, this leaves open 
the question of whether the West is able to muster sufbcient counter-force. 
For the United States, this means, among other things, whether it will have 
enough mobile forces in readiness to support local forces in any area whose 
defense is critical from the U.S. viewpoint. 
As it becomes widely realized that the USSR has not only acquired the 
+ility to bring thermonuclear devastation to the American homeland b-ut is 
&Q maintaining large forms for both limited nuclear war and conventional 
*&forces in amst irnpOrtad bf&s ~uperior'to what the West has now-&& 
mptahn  =$ Be gnat tb scurry back to the single s h c e  of massive retalia- 
tion. There ate some cogent. arguments for such a couxse. 3t is -certarmy 
chetpf to rely on -one weapons sy~em;  & seems a katitjnil dedsioh'to thorn 
who believe thatr myth i~g  .beyond the $mall- brushfire will unleash strategic 
airpower in any-ca~e;: and it ms the only pradeable strategy to' thosem who 
despair of the AlUest'e ability .to meet due'Sovi& .bloc on any level of warfam 
t-g large of. military manpower. - 
However, the alleged inability .of the West to organize sufficient opposition 
on the leva of limited war does not result from a p u & y  of resources but 
rathe* from a lack of to commit an adequate proportion of its resonrce 
wed& to this purpose. Nor should it be taken for granted that the democratic 
countries are incapable of meeting this challenge once the need for doing so 
is made sufbciently dear. Most important, a reliance on massive retaliation for 
deterring all ~ C o m r k i s t  aggrkion beyond the 'smallest border sldrmishes 
means that the United States would then gamf;le the survival of the West either 
on Seviet tear of retaliation or on Soviet forbearance. No matter what par- 
ticdar form Soviet aggression might take, the United States would cominand 
only one form of response. In eiery instance, regardless of locale and other 
cirmmstanoes, the United States would be forced to choose between walking 
to the -brink of total war or leaving Soviet aggression unopposed. Can the 
West count on always having the netve to &er to the Soviet Union the threat 
of- mutual destruotion? . ~nd-can we always count on the Soviet Union to let 
itself be detmed? Surely, too, the policy of massive retaliation is likely to 
iiisrease the risk'of all-out war being precipitated inadvertently. 
U m i W  War Cupability7t What are the alternatives to the strategy of 
the singb stance? Must the United States settle on such rigidity in i@ re- 
sponse? Assuming that an e f f d v e  balance of mutual terror wiU deter resoit 
to strtitegib nuclear fmces by both the United States and the Soviet Unim,'it 
is-far from easy to indicate the kinds of defense which the United States &odd 
command. ( ~ t - i s  ass-ed that the capacity to deter aggression requires the 
ab%tyb to beat back :various types of aggression.) 
If- we distinguish h e e n  different levels. of war-ra&ing from conflicts 
wig4 with conventional, pre-nuclear weapons at one extreme; to all-out 
thermonuclear hostilities at the other-we might locate in between several 
types of limited warfaie fought Gth tactical nuclear arms. These might be 
scaled in terms of Gore or le&rigorous limitations on weapons and t a r g e  
Such di&rentiation has been made familiar by the school of thought that 
advbtes "graduated 'deterrence." For example, if there were another Kot- 
War, one- could in matters of target selection distinguish betkeen asink 
nuclear* weapons- in Korea only and using them also for destroying enemy air. 
fie& across the Yalu %River. .. 
However, whethei; this graduation of tactical nuclear war can be made to 
stick in practice-that is, whethqr operationsOn any lower level can be k& 
from .a&ending to the highest level of- tactical atomic conflict-is a highly 
controversial There is no chance of making the distinction . . $tick 
bless both &des to tbe conflict can (1) formalIy or taeitly agree on restricting 
t$p5:opergtions tg, ,ag gihwLene--apee&t inv*g qwti&* of mm& 
m* : iddb4 i ,op&&iid 4 &$hitimi a d  dbctivb - bd~&&~c@*g 
(a ..Barn md5cieat *a -deTaQ1 m-M a+i&& ,+f the.* , ~ d j  
mt :ShodiI g,rduitwI d h i  -pidye ~imPr&&cd, prd * h e  : 160 
&m?Je&&: iconeq.6iQn4 +- 7 a&&r. ; n&.u. Gapk' W&+% F - pp:al,lqm af :p$~p-ive dame men^ ~ . h r  &6&0h ~ I , W  'p~&' -bn. &e- 
mmpth ~'6f d y !  'theei-leveEs; dt]romgK it- ddd '  be' i~* ' adapt& -to '-h 
*@tips: ~ & a n ~ r t ~  &icesm s - . . . . ,  .-. I. I : ) ;  . . . . .- \ , )  * .  
, % hi.! fi~&-&@~ + deter, aggr&doai and .J dd&t it lehould '&drr;eh& fail, .Iha 
id& ,dd&rae: h m t o r y  *odd seemi : to ,includ& d o i -  'f6t& kt .&&'&+l of 
limited war least disadvantageous to the United.'Statei and, 'ibdqe t h  
fed -Ievd, mobgb form .to defer thc oppontit f~diri' raisidg -ante. The, 
omatmt wilk accept defeat (that is, limited defeat) at %he level preferred 
~ts 6nly ifhbI.ma& ape& gseater l& from a relaxation of he prevding 
b i t s  -oh warfare But the ability to threatm the en* with &acceptable 
on a higher bvel is not moaigh anl- the U h i d '  Stat& and its &w 
am :stran& enough tb age&. defeat oa the pcderred lme1.' . 
- 24 +@g,n%ion :&ot be: dPtezreded abogethm, whikh knel of r-ed war 
&auld be preferred By &E Thited States? (We am s s s d g  that unlimited 
wcl-m+ war b not ttie p r e f d  leidTof cuntlist, d m s  'this option becomes 
the f6nly ahaiiiitive to ~sur~ender bizause, the defensive pikition of the .Weat 
bkx:pmes hopelees on d lower levels.) - > 
 is p~~isi]>le bat far from certain (despite Sejcrehwy Ddes's assurance) ' 
thaGtactica1 nuclear war is for the U~6ted St- the preferred level for deter-! 
ring +or fighting limited engagements, even if the possibly co&&g i n t e r 4  
ad .&is c ~ t i n l ~ ? ~  allies could be disregarddwa Indeed, to this and &ted qdes 
tions, there.probahty cluin~t be a elearcat tlosrcr. If one e q m t s  the Russian& 
tb aquip themielv& l i k d  with rha tecMogical. m-s f&%&idu~&~ 
tactical ouclesr operations, and does not .automatialIy aswune US. tech&-- 
l + d  ~supkiority -in this r a p e  the Unitd- States and some of its.a&* 
must pcmms a edi tant id  Idapmity of this End in order to dstai'or rep61 
Siao-Soviet. agg~essibxa. They . m y  .need litde lesa m i b q  man&wer 'khan 
m ~ ' p r d ~ ~ g t : ~ d ~ ~ e  fo~rces xeg$m . lhe n ~ e r i c a l  m g t h  of &e tactical 
n&r fbrce would dq&d on the size doc.& Soviet for- the relative 
nio.lditpof tlre -Soviet aad he* b S i  fthc troopa required for supply 
and for otherwise servicing sbep-mames 'of~.rompli~8ted gear, an&very! 
iarpoxtantlyqhe replacements for awudtiegl tbat might be very l a r e  And, 
erm-if there should be a saving in lk nmnbers of mili&ary mmp~wer,  'thk 
tea &art i f  providing a tactical nudear capability of s&cient~.siEe may 
-1- :*-;even e x 4  that of pr&ding a C 0 1 1 k n t i 8 n d  capacity; That .& 'btk 
cairn tba r d  .raurces to be expended on both trainingaad equipment .psr 
man E m . 3 h d  nucltiar c o d k t  will-piob&ly surpaap such xqiendittirea pea; 
B e d .  far. r..caventional fightkg farce. 
' 
- : ~ , ~ a . $ i m  1313 pFobability-thhr a-tacticel rmeI&r eap&ty is not a cheap 
slrbstitatei .for u comtional one, the levti1 d! war for which .it is rbqoired. 
leiy or'nmp tnotq+aat the Unitat St- at a greae advdntt~ge v&+is th 
blor: than the'kvel of &odi&-wta& tvith ,p.r&n.ac1-ear Weapons. Wh- 
the comparative advantage lies for the United States hinges on a variety of 
conditions that are hard to predict. Much depends, for instance, on the actual 
limits observed in a tactical nuclear conflict. The United States might face an 
intractable problem of supply should the Russians be free to attack American 
supply lines on land and sea. To give another example, the United States 
might suffer serious political losses abroad if it were to counter conventional 
aggression, especially in peripheral aras, by a nuclear riposte.' Furthermore, 
since the limits on conventional war are far easier to define (and hence to 
enforce) than the limits on tactical nuclear operations, conventional engage- 
ments are less likely to end up inadvertently in unlimited hostilities. This may 
well be a crucial consideration. 
Whatever the level of limited war preferred by the United States, the need to 
impose this preference on a prospective enemy raises further problems of great 
complexity. Of course, no need for enforcement would arise if both the United 
State and the USSR have a strong interest in limiting warfare to the same 
level-a condition which is likely to prevail (at least for some time) as far as 
progression to total war is concerned. Yet suppose the interests of the two 
powers diverge: If tactical nuclear war is its preferred level, the United States 
must wield a sdlicient deterrent on the strategic nuclear level to keep the 
adversary from raising the ante to unlimited war should he face defeat on 
the level preferred by the United States. On the other hand, if conventional 
war were the level preferred by this country, any enemy option for the tactical 
atomic level would have to be denied either by an American ability to cause 
the enemy more unacceptable losses on the higher level, or-going one step 
further-by throwing in the threat of unlimited war. To use the latter enforcer 
would be much cheaper in terms of defense outlays but the risk of increasing 
the likelihood of all-out war would have to be set against this saving. 
The Al l i~:  The entire ~roblem is somewhat different for the countries in 
Western Europe and elsewhere along the periphery of the SinoSoviet bloc, 
for they are potential theaters of hostilities in the event of limited war. Few, 
if any, of them can hope by themselves to stop Soviet military aggression on 
any level. If they cannot expect help from outside, their best strategy, if they 
do not prefer surrender, is to rely on strategic nu+r power-provided they 
can supply themselves with the necessary weapons system, protect it from 
elimination by surprise attack, and hence threaten the aggressor with enough 
destruction to make local aggression unprofitable. 
Only the countries allied with the United States have a wider range of 
choices. They need not, of course, maintain a strategic nuclear deterrent 
of their own as long as the American deterrent is sure to '  be used for 
their protection-a condition that may not always prevail as a matter of 
wurse. Assuming that it does prevail, they might not, at first sight, prefer 
preparations for tactical nuclear war. For if aggression is not forestalled, and 
they are likely to become the theater of operations, they may expect an un- 
acceptable degree of devastation. Based on this e-tion, they might  refer 
either the threat of massive retaliation by the United States against the Soviet 
Union in tbe event of Soviet aggression against their own territories-the 
chance that New York and Detroit are obliterated rather than Paris and &sen 
i-or a level of limited warfa&, e.g., conventional hostilities, likely to be least 
harmful to themselves. Eercising the first option would allow such countries 
to slight their own defense effort, and spare them a high degree of devasta- 
tion; however, should the American threat fail to deter the C o ~ u n i s t s ,  they 
would also have to accept the prospect of conquest by the Soviets. 
A further grand strategy open to allies of United States is to fa1 in 
with this country if it chooses to establish a solid capability for waging lim- 
ited nuclear war-and this despite the prospect of crippling destruction should 
such a war actually be fought on their own territories. The purpose of such 
a choice would be not to wage such a war but to deter it (as well as any seri- 
ous aggression on the lower level) by maintaining a capacity clearly superior 
in all critical areas to Soviet means for waging limited conflicts. The draw- 
back of this strategy is a large outlay of resources by the United States i d  
its allies. 
Our allies' choice depends in large part on American policy and hence can, 
to some extent, be influenced by the United States. Conversely, whatever atrat- 
egy these countries chooseand the choice may vary for different countries, 
and for each country over time-it cannot help but complicate the task of 
American defense planning, for the United States can hardly ignore the pref- 
erences of its chief allies. 
Two conclusions stand out in this matter of searching for a sound defense 
policy : 
1. American planning has almost certainly gone too far in cutting ready 
surface forces, particularly in the Army, for deterring and fighting limited 
war. In addition to strong pressures for a lower defense budget, this neglej 
resulted from a time lag in recognizing and adjusting to the U.S. loss of un- 
chaIIenged supremacy in thermonuclear airpower. 
2. Laying down a sound strategy for defense in this world of rapid change 
is a task of inordinate dSculty. The crucial problem is uncertainty in so 
many respects. This would present no trouble if the United States were able 
to afford unlimited resources for defense and hence could prepare itself for all 
contingencies. Yet the need to select and discriminate cannot be avoided; and 
there can be' little confidence that any simple strategy adopted will guarantee 
the security of this country. Whatever direction is chosen for the effort of the 
United States, there will be an inescapable chance that it is riding for a faU 
Air defemse?: The ability to fight abroad is by no means the only capa- 
bility puzzling American planners. In some degree, home defenses against 
thermonuclear air attack must supplement the maintenance of offensive forces. 
The United States has made considerable efforts to improve its active air 
defense, with the protection of SAC bases receiving a high priority; but 
&emely little has been done in civil defense, passive defense (dispersal and 
hardening of civili'an targets), and in preparing the country for recovery from 
h r g e d e  dmct ion .*  Even though an unlimited thermonuclear .assault on 
k~iiiiiii 
*&'or a e e d g  hqah.p-hto tbe problem aea Civil Def- for National S d d .  H- .bdore 
~ubmmmittee .of the .L Committee on Cove-nt Operatio?, House of Representatives,. 84th CO-88, 
Sereion, Partr E7, (Warhbgton), 1956. 
the Uniw. Stam must be, expected. to mutilate this country beyond rew@-- 
tion a d  'confrobt the surviving pop&tic~n with ~&~~ecedented problems & 
survival &d recuperation, the neglm-of air defense can' be defended on theser 
, ' . I  ) , I  srOnn&: I - : ,  j * There iiKq.now..nd known t ~ h n o 1 0 ' g i c a L ~ s  for deftmas against - - 
,I pla~es and &s+ good enoikh to; afford ap+ere near tbe high d- of ,( 
protection feaiible against air attack during' the,.S&ond World War. , -r 
Any. high degree of passive defense, thro;lgh-the dispersal or- hardening 
of civilian targets, is not only extremely costly but would also require intoler-: 
able changes in the peacetime life of the 4 
In view of the .technical superiority of offensive airpower over all known. 
defenses, it is relatively easy and cheap for a prospective enemy to comter 
costly defensive measures by a marginal increase in his offensive capabilityi: 
Under these circumstances, there is a good deal to be said for allocating 
additional resources, if still needed, to the American capacity for r e t a l i a t i o ~  
present an$ future-and thereby deter any aggressor from launch-. 
ing a& ?&out attack. . . 
I This jk&cat&n for t&e present policy depends largely on the precise u& 
this coiultry expects to make of its strategic( air arm. The decision to slight. 
&orti on active and passive defense is more likely to be sound if the Unitql) 
States expect to use SAC strictly for deterring unlimited aggression by the 
USSR. It is less likely to be sound if the United States freely employs the 
threat of its nuclear airpower to deter Soviet Ruasia from limited- aggression' 
p d  walks $0 the brink of war with considqable frequency. Such resort to. 
$AC's punch must to some extent increase &e probability of unlimited war 
braking out, if only inadvertently. A strategy of relying so heavily on mat, 
tegic airpower may warrant a, relatively smaller outlay on tactical surfam 
forces designed for limited war, but it hardly ju&es the neglect of air 
defense at tbe same time. Since to maintain strategic airpower i s  a must, her? 
is some Iogic in seeing air defense and a limited-war capacity a8 cornpetbe 
claimpnts on defense resources; but the neglect of both, as the United States 
has done in recent years, is hard to justify. . 
There are further reasons for favoring an investment in a degree of a& 
defii118e which is marginal yet a great deal more substantial than has been 
attempted so far. A hardening of cidian targets by means of shelter p r y  
&aip for reducing casualties at Lhe periphery of bomb bursts, Where heat &d 
b U  have spent most of their force, would involve expenditurea of 
$10 to &I0 billion over a number of years, depending on tha degree of margi- 
ad protection desired. Such a program could not prevent huge casualties, but - 
it- might save as much as one-third or more of tbe population o t h d ,  
doomed to death or injury. An effort in this direction wo$d be a partid 
&Surance against the risk, however small it is hoped to be,. that un-I 
war break out. It would also assure the Kremlin that he United Stam 
meana business and will not flinch in the face of Russian threats. 
The question of how large a proportion of defense resources should be 
ehannelkd into research and development for active air defepse Ekewise w; 
not be considered senled in favor'of a relatively modest effort, At the ~ r d -  
d p ? ~ i & g ' ~ & + ~ l ~ p ~ ~  &,b&.&&tlM~~& .as an *$& agbI 
&##&,& mh ,.a :fa- .&a&, :.wuC -' and. o&bO1@$caf obeshklq 
Yet mearch and development, if backkd B? i t p g n ~ t r  effort~:ea~*g&l,~&tt?i 
in th6 htpf~a. 0%8ims1& 'if eith& && United Siteis'  or $ q 6 ~  
Rh- ia  ~buocseded -in de~$Iq&g'a~li di$f&lie'dY&ern,'.it $&dd~c&fq', 
at la& for ; -, , .- : ma&@' ~ r [ r w  L M$aiytage* Yo* *&h mww:  
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hient) and h brkdth J(&@ - h ~  we do not -inaihtein a wi$e enough; 
Caohi'bf military readom), why has 'Zh(rre.been this ictck? The ~ S W &  is
n d y  co~np1ex; only some of its h&an&:bm* be ideneifid and -&a&nd 
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d d  for &-, ~hm~eper, %hiis s h'&dlf:a major fador, for this eouriw 
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lomic load 
N EXT TO the question of doctrine, the problem of allocations must oe first rank. The problem is chiefly one of attitudes. One of these, com- 
placency, has been underscored in recent months. Of the others, the most 
important ones are the fear that an excessive allocation of resources to defense 
will tmdermine the American economy; the gnawing doubt that the military 
manage the resources allotted to them with cirsumspection and efficiency; and 
finally, the public's reluctance to pay the tab. All of these attitudes come 
seriously into play because defense costs in the modern age are inordinately 
high. 
The High Costs d Defense: Compared with previous periods of formal 
pea&, recent American defense costs have been fluctuating at a very high 
level. From 1930 to 1939, the United States spent a little over 1 per cent of its 
GNP on national security. Even in 1939, with war imminent, the share was 
a little under 1.5 per cent. In contrast, the outlay on national security (includ- 
ing atomic energy and foreign military aid) averaged 6.5 per cent during the 
four years from 1947 to 1950 and, following the extraordinary expenditures 
in the Korean War, nearly 11 per cent during the three years from 19% t6 
1956. Several factors account for this "quantum jump" : 
The sharp rise in defense costs reflects in large part Soviet and 
the bipolar structure of world power which places the main Western military 
burden on the United States. Old mainstays, such as the Royal Navy, no 
longer serve to protect the s&urity of this country. ' 
0. Effective security now rests o v e ~ ~ h e l m i n ~ l ~  on r&dy strength rathet 
+my as previously, on a war potential to be mobilized in time of emergency. 
Whether it is for deterring all-out nuclear attack or repelling local aggression, 
the need is for forces instantly on hand. 
Technological progress has greatly raised the ski11 and hardware needs 
of the armed forces. Planes are much more expensive to produce and main- 
tain, crews are much more expensive to train than formerly, etc. R 
The extraordinary quickening in the pace of weapons development not: 
only demands increasingly large resources for remarch and development; it 
&o subjects expensive equipment, and the skill to use it, to an unprecedented 
rate of obsolescence. To render existing weapons obsolete is the very purpose 
of research and development, and the need for doing so is compelling if 
soviet technological competition is to be met. 
These four conditions alone have greatly revolutionized the nature of the 
U.S. security problem. Yet there is still a fifth factor: the inescapable need to 
cope with uncertainty. As was pointed out above, we are facing an unusual 
technological uncertainty and, as wil l  be observed below, we are under the 
pressure of economic uncertainty. Above all, there is strategic uncertainty- 
that is, there is no obvious answer to the question of which kind of military 
posture the United States should favor. It is therefore desperately diflicult to 
decide how much would best be spent on SAC, on limited-war capacity- and 
of what kind, or on civilian and active air defense. Since there is a limit on 
the total effort the United States is able and willing to make, the need to 
choose is unavoidable: and any decision entails a large risk of being proven 
faulty in the future. For example, future events might present us with fright- 
ful consequences if the United States. put defense resources overwhelmingly 
into the strategic airforce and starved its ability to cope with limited wars by 
limited means; if an overemphasis on civilian air defense came to impair 
SAC, the consequences might be similarly calamitous. And even if the plan- 
ners could be- sure of having made the right forecast in 1957, which they can 
hardly be, they cannot hope that the forecast will stand in 1958 or 1959, for 
the conditions of strength and weakness in the Soviet orbit and in the rest of 
the world, and our knowledge of them, are incessantly in flux. Rather, effi- 
ciency demands a constant readiness to revise all choices in response to 
changing circumstances. 
The Problem of Choice: Nor doas this b d  of uncertainty confound the 
planner only on the level of general strategy. The problem of prediction and 
choice appears on numerous levels throughout the military establishment. 
How much more should we spend on increasing the mobility of our ground 
forces? How many more aircraft carriers s h d d  we construct, and how many 
submarines capable of launching rockets? How many fighter and bombing 
planes of any particular type should we manufacture at any one time, when 
improved types are already on the drawing boards? What proportion of 
ddense funds should be allocated to research; how much to basic- research, 
how much to the improvement of weapons likely to be out-of-date t h ~ e  or
four years hence? How much should we spend on developing guided and 
ballistic missiles as against manned aircraft? How much should be spent an 
radar screens as against shelters, how much stockpiles? The lid of'choioes 
seems endlesa But all the choicerg mnst be exercised and, once made, que~r 
t iod  and, if necessary, r e v w .  
This f~rmidable prdpm of p ~ d i o n  A d  choice has tbree weighty 
implications. First, m y  of the ~hoiscrs to be made may have awfd co- 
&am may 8 e r i d y ,  or even &astxonsly, affect the future survival 
of the nation. If we shift too large a preportion of our funds from plane and 
missile production to reaearcb and devdop~ent, we may find ourselves at a 
critical moment without enough s e n i d l e  planes and mkiles-for proto- 
types cannot fight. If we economize excawively cm research and devebpmmt, 
including basic research, we may discover some day that the Soviet Union 
haa achieved a technological br-o~h in a weapons system which ren- 
ders our forces-in-being obsolete. If we are pareimonious about active and 
civilian air defense, snd the Big Deterrent fails to deter, we may have c r u d  
tba death of miUiom who might have survived. If H T ~  economize ex-ively 
on mobile ,dace and tactical air forces (including a large airlift capacity) 
that are able to do combat in local wars, we may me C o d s t  rule expand 
by means of military blackmail or local warfare because we hesitate to un- 
1 4 .  an unlimited nudear war of mutual destruction. 
Second, and to repeat, many of the fateful decisions are extremely hard to 
make. Even our information -on current Soviet intentions and capabilities is 
subject to marked error and, at the high level of policy-making, even firm . 
estimates may be disregarded because their implications go against the graih 
of established assumptions and preferences. But the allocative choices on 
defense that we make today concern future contingencies, and our ability to 
predict future situations in all relevant aqmcts is utterly inadequate. It & 
certainly less dependable than officials of the Defense Department admit .when 
they justify important decisions. To the kt-informed persaw, it must 
inevitably appear that the probability of error is substantial and inescapable, 
In short, the risk of making wrong decisions is as great as the consequences of 
wrong decisions are perilous. 
Third, throughout the military establishment, there is a lengthy lead time, 
ohan stretching over several years, &re h is ions  on the developmat of 
weapons or new fighting units yield nevr military power ready .for immediate 
use. It took six years for the B-52 to move from the drawiagboard stage to 
that of combat readiness. It takes a long time from the initial decision to 
man, equip and train an airborne division. This lengthy cycle in the pro- 
duction of modern military forces means that many errors in deciding on 
the size, composition and equipment of the 'armed services cannot he 
quickly retrieved. 
The triple fact that, in making important decisions on defense, errors are 
likely to be frequent, fateful -and (except over long time-spans) irrevocable 
clearly underscores the need for prudence. The price of gambling is formid- 
able. We dare not assume that we can predict ,with any degree of prmision 
the size and kind of military defense which will give us any desired degree 
of security in 1959 or 19M, and proceed to cut out forces, weapons and re- 
searoh programs which, according to the prediction, we will not need. In the 
face of uncertainty, prudence requires that we insure against error, that we 
--r merd beta bn d&aicim involving high shakes* This $ what the Sddet 
rulers are doing. Recognizing that protracted lana .warn of atp5h.n- a*, 'h- 
likalt~ ( andda t  d o t 1 1  n d & ,  w e q ~ o d b * ~  not p r d t  the ma&g bf.'huge 
-land armiie, am rd~kchg tha: &b& of &r,di-ons. B~~t,Wliii'tba 
'Unitdid Stat@ &by 'are mahta&iiagc .a -&gMy vehMe. -8 E'ozhtd military 
.&*-' l.&g.,&em a & &ilee!'&;mEgry *.iafia *d ? g respon& at . e n ~ t ; h *  &J an q :  + j , ,  
- 4 ell iadmdaike', . h s m i ~ ~  far om :dd&+ . -Wi& anr given degrea.'ol in~ellige4nld~ in decid6rlis, Be 
'&ge, tht*hauid& beche  otn ch&ce~~aridlttie ~ O r e  ni&t 
.caflk%tj+ ,t&d&'thei & L L ~  df the fitturn* Th&? id' 
agree- ~ S A  &e*& ta:]~clabtab tfie Big memento B U ~  tk more we jlhnit 
&& tdtd ; a & A  & v-t && Il@&& i y *hme d&&y&t 
taxi& ta dl ~ l e s b  i  *ava&tb1'& foi. Miice, f & e  & eivii) defedk.*fn 
taeth$~oughge'i hate-hearihgs on k a i p e r - h  19% it wi~ptbhted out 
' &s9 the '&k&ti3es of the Secr&av 0f ikfenise to .&B$ anned~~q+e& concern- 
kgfde:fmse ~ d ~ ~ r e s  in &al'yedrs 1956,and 1957 abounded in words 
~ u c h  a "eliminate," "reduce,"' ' ‘ c u ~ , "  and   postpone? It mu& be 'ex- 
~ X W A  that s m ~  preasurs t o  &o~+&. winf compel very risb CMCXS on 
r d k h ,  hinrentaries an& dozkns of othet things which niay snBsequtdy 
prov6,to have wmkmed our national security. 
In c o n d u s i ~  thes hrger the tcitkl !tbmmes we mak6 &ailable,.the 1 4  the 
risk thet we f l . 8 n d  o U r d m  i l l - p r e p d  to sdeguad our future 
of * d v a l .  Not',ev& the UGted States can pratect it& against all future 
contingenc&. B u t ' m f i g  do*- to absolate "emti&!' k risky in vfew of 
oar Mtd lability to d&e aflat6the &&ltrte *esset&ialsn are,-the dangerous 
comqu6nt%s ~ f ~ e m o ] ~ ~ ~  ddmituns~and the difffculty of recoveting fumble& 
. - . I 
'7 4. I:, .. K::,cIi Can the tconomy SI,., . 
The Feat: With defense makink ,tecessdy huge claims on the nati-io 
resources, it is not surprising that a further element of uncertainty has con- 
founded American planning: Can the American economy stand so large a 
strain year after year for a presumably indefinite period? The recent disposi- 
tion to cut outlays on defense was given some urgency by Congressional hoe 
tility to even a temporary breaching of the Federal debt limit, and by the 
determination, especially strong through the first three quarters of 1957, to 
reduce inflationary pressures. Yet the main economic concern has been rooted 
in the profound fear that too large a defense budget will undermine the health 
of the American economy. President Eisenhower and numerous other officials 
have voiced this anxiety repeatedly. 
Unfortunately, there are no ready answers to the pestion of how large a 
burden of defense the economy can "stand" over a long period of time. Few 
of the officials concerned ever trouble themselves even to define what they 
mean by a "sound economy" or to explain in a meaningful way how a rise in 
defense expenditures by a few billion dollars would subvert the economy. Nor 
is @ a new impediment to r a t i d  doice. ,In SW,i emmipleL Presilkent 
Tntman decided that tEiPr. budgit. for fiscal 3 9 S . b  k@t a m  to. $15 
billion, although Ref- sty. J a m e ~  FhrrdaI and W, *mi& chi* 
wanted at least .$l8 b i b &  %ugh. other reasom were aBdanec8'td jnatifi di& 
economy move, P-i tap3 Jemce Webb, Erector of .the Bui'u 
.of the Budget, kmd mn f fhe~~tmpned that a defense budget of '315 
billio? w e .  ,&@a eouliil stand, and this argument made e 
strong hgre885m-t-an S-ql F-i, h e r d  Omat Bm61q, and others. 
$15 billion amounted then to. d o a t  5&:par ant' of the. Grea '~atisnal Prod- 
.sot..ib &@. men% &er &:at&m w&%mke out, ddenrse @xpendfktx rose 
, abom $50 fbWon; d a t i n g  ta ovef 14 -per cent of the. @l,. 6th kvsdts 
thst; by. gmy acceptable standard, failed kt ~ r b k  t h e ~ h r i & .  ;ecgaorny. - 
Y* & 1956, tbia arbured sharp fkra 'lest ddeiwkpendi& 
~aee~1p in E958 to a point whic4,if we espect t h e G N ~  to m to 
about $430 billion, would claim 11 per cent. The obvious need is to LIed~cate" 
.&hi fear, to. mole it more b f d  by emplorhig the ill effects which dtema- 
.tive levels of deferme 0tla3i:s may c a w  to economy. TO do so is adaaittay 
-=c$It. Indeed, the strdng a d & h  withi whleh people dntile3pdie 
debilitating effects of large'debease outlays on tlie monomy 5-aS in lstrikhg 
w t r a a  -- to tbe paucitp af einpirid bdwldge kbdixt'such eff-k 
In -the reap- to any lev$ of &Bea,se spading, one distinction Gust be 
made at the outset* There are two qudonG'that are relevant: Erst, do we 
pewnaUy Eke to beau our &are in the taz kb involved; &an though there 
be no s u b v e r b  of the nation's economy? And, second, even thou& .we are 
not personally o p p d  to bearing our &am in the tar burden, is it under- 
mining the .health of the economy? No doubt, some people -who do nd wbh 
to have a hrge proportion of their i n c o d  taxed use the "~onnd-econonay~ 
argument in order to makeenheir opposition! mu the fmt wore ~espectable. But 
the.two responses turn on ahogeaher difImb~~iersue% and &y w& differ re- 
, . . - 
g d h g  my propOeea. levd of @bg. 1 1 Z. - .  
Btm~i t  Cemeqmenc.r d Defmserk The& shonld be general agyee- 
meat on the - proposiribn' 1.that a. functioning American economy 
exhibits the followhg%hme c&maot&stiw: 
1. Major inflationary and dddomny- cycles are avoided whik then ia 
rGseonably full smploymen~ - 
2. The present balance between private aha public economic decisions is 
not seriously ugspt. 
3. Moat impom* investment and innovation keep the economy 
growing in pl"odu&ve power so that the real Gross National Prod& ketps 
risingbYat3~3i5perdcptayear. 
Now, the dm- that large defense budgets xault in monetaryry instability 
or in a substantial spread of new Federal icmtrols over economic life, hinge 
primarily on the pub& willin- to be taxed. The 8ecnriitp benefib which 
various Web of defenA expenditures can buy take the phm of hefits from 
privsta or other public eqeditww which conld have bemimade instead. It 
. ia tor thei h e r i c m  ddmtarate' to weigh and m~predmse Bete of bedits  in 
the light of the information available to it. The -5ig @hie will be mdded 
through the political process. Ordinarily, this decision will touch on the fun& 
tioning of the American economy under only one major circumstance, as long 
as full employment prevails. Wanting both to have the cake and eat it too, 
the public might wish to spend more on defense than it is currently willing to 
pay by foregoing other uses of a corresponding portion of its income. In that 
event, inflationary pressures may result If prolonged and severe, these will 
obstruct the efficient operation of the economy and, by encouraging the use 
of direct governmental controls over the private use of resources, disturb the 
operation of the relatively free economic system. 
Since the defeme effort now needed is of indefinite duration, sound policy 
requires it to be put on a pay-as-you-go basis. It is for the Government to 
gauge the spending level which the public is willing to accept. Should 
this level fall appreciably short of what is required on military grounds, it is 
for the nation's leadership to explain to the public why larger outlays must 
not be shirked. 
This leaves the problem of whether, or to what extent, a persistently large 
defense effort will clog the sources of growth in the American economy. 
Indubwly, this is a sigeificant problem, for the defense effort rests in large 
part on the economy, and whatever the security burdens imposed on it, they 
can be borne more easily if the GNP keeps rising rapidly and with some 
steadiness. A $500 billion economy gives the United States more strength on 
which to draw than a $400 billion economy. 
Those who fear that defense outlays at recent levels do serious harm to the 
economy suspect that the onerous tax load involved dulls the income incentives 
behind hard and productive work, enterprise and investment, and diminishes 
the ability as well as the willingness to save. The problem is one of the total 
tax burden in relation to the national income and one of the specific tax struc- 
ture on the basis of which revenues are collected. 
Concerning the first problem, there is thus far no empirical evidence for the 
fear that a. defense effort absorbing between 10 and 12 per cent of the GNP 
will act as a perceptible drag on American economic growth. Ever since 
defense outlays and taxes were lifted to very high levels at the time of the 
Korean War, the economy has been blessed by satisfactory rates of saving, 
investment and innovation. Such intensive studies as have been made of per- 
sons in high-income brackets, though not entirely conclusive, have revealed a 
great deal of grumbling over high tax rates but, in the aggregate, only a neg- 
ligible slackening of productive effort. Moreover, when taxes bear down on 
the receivers of middle incomes, their aggregate response has apparently been 
to increase effort in order to maintain fairly rigid expenditure patterns in- 
volving insurance, homes, education, vacations and durable consumers' goods. 
It is, of course, conceivable that, regardless of the particular tax structure, 
the total tax load could be raised to a level that would impair incentives and 
diminish the ability to save Nobody, however, knows at what level these 
harmful effects would become substantial. It is surely plausible that there is 
no sharp breaking point--say, a specific pacentage of the national income 
claimed by taxes-at which these dects would become suddenly important. 
One would rather expect that, once generated, these effects would at first be 
marginal and mild, and increase only gradually i f  the t m  burden were r a i d  
progressively. It also seesur reasonable to conelude that ,$he total mount of 
taxes sow collected is one which h i a n  economy can absorb without 
becoming debilitated, 4 a somewhat larger burden-for example, an- 
other 2 or 3 per cent of the GNP-is fqirly safe. Much of the complaint &out 
high taxes simply expresses the understandable preference of citizens to spend 
more of their inc- for private q&er than public purpoaa. - 
W h a t t ~ t ~  he total brd.en.>~lf~:-m ldneva, it h the w structure which 
has an independent and important bearing on income incentives and on.the 
public's capacity to save. It is peral ly agreed that the American tax System js 
antiquated and incomistent, and understandable only in term of the poliEi-1 
pressures , h t  &aped and reshgped .it over time. Extremely high' marB;;.I 
taxes on corporate a d  iadividual inmmes have encouraged practices which, 
@ording wpe, ~ p e  horn the bite of ebe tax collector, lead to uneconomic 
af resa~mp and cause s e - i o ~  iampitim be%ideg, It is possible that this 
uciu~e. has somgwhaf retarded, though not, of course, prevented Ameri- 
m~economio growth in the recent pest; and e b  such dampening effects 
become more h p t i v e  if tatsl volumw of tsun is increased for 
sea of defense, a review of the Federal tax, stmatwe ahodd receive a 
priority, .The appe~ranoe of any &anEial disincentive eE6cts could be 
r retarded by reducing tax rates on large incomes and tighte:&g the 
awhg system of tax exemption& A stname of taxation ;designed to .en- 
ecwomio growth woukl counteract tbe risk that hi* lev&. of 
se spending might subvert the American. economy. . - 
Py, whatever the strain which a large dehnse effort may pkce on the 
ecopomy9 it must not be forgoben that its consequences are not all injurious. 
Some of tihe befieficial consequences are, to 4ie sure, conditional on other 
c i ~ t ' c ~ c e s ,  a  when a high level of Federa1 spending sets limits to a 
d w b  in general business activities. Bgt &em ate also by-products of a large 
defense e%ort which, thowh hard to t r~ae:  and hposs&1e to measure, are 
unconditionql and significant. For one thimg, defense-supported training of 
skilled manpower and investmat .in p h t  have expanded this c0~11tr)t'~ 
capacity to prodnee .at an ~ 1 ~ r a t . e d  pace, and not all of this expansion is  ip 
lines nssful only to ddmm For .another, and more importantly, defense 
eorpenditurm have h d e d  .the d~doplaent of atomic energy, electronic com- 
putation, qnd many other products and productive techniques. 
No do&, this emti -8pw to science end t&olo@l advlr~l~e has yielded 
vast benefits.; and t b  benefits are kmmhg much larger than they did in 
the past be=- an .bcreashg &axe of the defense dollar finances research 
and development 
,To conclude, it is mo& improbable that defense -ding in the neighbor- 
hood of the current scale, between 9 and 12 per cant of ,the GNP, will ruin 
the American emnomy. There is m e  r.i& .but a risk d y  gradually increw 
kg, of a net damage to the forces of economic growth if t a x ~ s  were raised 
above this range; and this risk wuld be minimbed by adapting thg tar strue- 
bare to the promotion of growth. The current fear of this risk seems mag- 
geratsd and shodd not stand in the way of some %crease in the def- 
effort, provided this is clearly required on military grounds. Moreover, in the 
event of need, some risk to the economy's functioning must be accepted as 
preferable to inadequate security against eidernal aggression. At present, the 
United States seems to be running a far greater and far more dangerous risk 
of being insufficiently prepared for defense than of undermining its economy. 
5. Managing the Defense Emmm*~rt 
T wo further considerations militate against making adequate provision for defense. One is the deep-seated civilian suspicion that the military are 
always asking for too much and that it is safe, therefore, to apply almost 
automatically a sizable discount to their requests. But though this suspicion 
should not be relinquished, it is not at all clear that it should inspire more 
than prudent probini. The military cannot be relied upon to ask forAtoo much 
at all times. Furthermore, the organization of the Department of Defense has 
greatly strengthened civilian leadership and responsibility; the Bureau of the 
Budget plays an important part in checking budget requests; and the National 
Security Council offers a further opportunity for examining requests. To be 
sure, the effectiveness of these safeguards depends in no small measure on the 
personalities occupying the key positions. To reduce this particular weakness, 
and especially to make Congressional review more effective, there is much 
to be said for presenting budget requests first of all in terms of military mis- 
sions-strategic airpower, capacity for limited war, civilian defenseand 
only secondarily in terms of the traditional breakdown by the three armed 
services. This would show, to a greater extent than is the case now, just what 
kind of military strength the proposed budget dollars are expected to buy. 
Waste of Defense Dollars?: The other consideration follows from the 
persistent feeling among civilians that the military are wasteful with defense 
dollars and that a great deal more "defense worth" could be financed with 
available or even Galler funds if only the management of the defense effort 
were more efficient. To analyze the management performance of the military, 
to trace its ways of spending funds on numerous administrative levels and 
for numerous purpo&s, and to  suggest how present practices could be im- 
proved would be a task of formidable complexity, going clearly beyond the 
scope of this brief survey. It would also require a body of knowledge so vast 
and ditticult of access that few single individuals could manage it. The purpose 
of the following remarks is more modest: to inquire into the nature of the 
problem rather than to take up many specific instances of mismanagement 
and reform. 
Measured by some ideal standard of performance, or even by the actual 
standards of &cient business corporati~ns, the management of- the defense 
dollar is inefficient beyond doubt. Yet these criteria are of dubious relevance; 
and to accept the fact that what looks like gross inefficiency by these standards 
is not necessarily inefficiency in a military service, is probably the most im- 
portant step toward sober appraisal. For example, a military inventory of 
seemingly lavish supplies may, upon serious inquiry, turn out not to be lavish 
in inaisw oil &e unwrtainty with whiob .the. ~ & S I F ~  mast ba prepad to cope. 
mwt 4x1 ready tarsct wi&<watch at d m d e  b, in &forsees- 
sMeiplPcws and,ltn A busin- coapmtion, 
, which -*s,tbe risk rid ef 1-r pdit. dn 
invi~91t- failure of ha ~ a b p . m u i y ~ ~ ~ ~  serious mnsequencee to the nat.i:mv8 
mdty.-:ln,other w o d ~ , ~ t h b h & - d  range of wmrtainty, atid the entirely 
Werent charactar ;of the, ri%f s h v d d ,  d a b  *the concept . . of &ciency used 
in b w  Jagety- hizpplicmb -tat$ managem~?nt. - 
Qf; co- this b not. to say- that .smili~arp s ending is actually being man- 
aged wits, &eienay or @at+ .OR imiai~  level& -sad for some parpow, sound 
prinsi~1m <of rb~in,.e58 management. and accoaating do not apply. But to dis- 
cover* place for i-mp~ovd pradam, and to-intrini~ce them, must hrely be 
part 0% W e i~3ba  respan'sibility in the Dqartxmnt of1 Ddebrse, for the train- 
ing .of b! hGk~q;is, Bfter alli nog .+i~lly im  method^^ of mmagemt~4t and - 
accounting. Un the c i k  han plicatiom of bet$&$ ~mhm&ment pram- 
: hm&.;&t; *e*Ifi+&e .&- #&is, 
,d+rthiei rt&a&tiok which h d s  oBeer 
of ~tqbhiabaibn among .thb 
gtrbpo~on of SWS shouldntjt speoialixe~ia sniiiftary n u u l a q t  tasks and 
rmeim the m e  prd&ond .rewards enj ayeitt, by. ather ofimr~. 
M r g  Fo)?! In the past, Ole 7b~fiE.~ d d  .of enforcing . ~ C O ~ S ) I E I ~  on
&. milisuy ' baa been to sash lyrpropriatidns :+'acr&se the . boardn by some 
arbitmky ~ - a w u a I I y ~ ~ ~  
-a As--exp& has h o n s t r  
mast+ h&~e7 civilian method LOI 
stW~nF9 at ' - C ~ ~ g  ngo~rfaf~. whit& 
is 601Qd.to' b&reinmd~. alqdt .h -bbe &.I <%bm ay be eom9 h d i s w  gain 
is hardly designed to 
~BC- ~B&F €ill 
the count~y'a ~security. 
aets is inevitably mstehl. 
internaI.unit)i, the 
mrrrgjaaay least essemh1tt~ defene 
tried to practice such dhimination 
iteelf and- p d e  ki. detail which expedturm+ were to be reduced by. how 
much, it would - M e  quickly apparent :that the accomting and ~lmnag-t 
job involved called for rr huge a&ds~satiive.&od and, for purpc~es of infbr- 
mation a d  edo~carnent, for a disruptisre intemntion into m i c e  practices. 
Tlre -agar: approach hae a h&rl drawbackmiR~Eed xperience has led 
the pditaz?y:to epeet economy dGves-hoin time to thn~ and, in their adjust- 
m a - t o  #& familiar bast and famine cycle, they sre >naturally dis@ to 
~vemtats d k r  -tier11 ,reqGimmnts 4 @a that, e~ough "nn~le" is likely to 
m'm'5i.e .eaohleampaign. Clearly, this defensive reflex acts as a major imp&* 
mnagcntmt.. Fu&=e, on the .administrative levels 
of,-no-@a&ce8 must be carried ~ u t ,  there 
is .-ye to dd so bemaam any sa- are returned to.general bib. 
For exaz~ple,.a &deb pxqgram &f weapon ddopnient or a wasteful bven- 
tow p r d c a  a parti& service iambch more lSMy to be abandoned if the 
d d  h i d 6  become available for i e m r ~ h  and development, or $01 inven- 
:tori- in tbe m e  ' -or the .same service unit Although "incentive 
:the .-a d%hs Of Meme doflak, they 
with whiah+&w d & ~ s  are- baing +aanpl&ed. 
to an in colicapt- df heffi- 
chcy, AM d gtupen:do~. teehnologioal flaq ess of nspon~ie to 
W W )  'dangers €#ad* bpparEaa%ies ie as hportant a msuwe of hdfh&ncy as 
~ m t & ~ & k i ~ a  Waste d ofme, rathsr than of dollars, may. be ~tbe~~liimary 
w*w of Pentagon. ,> i ; .,;I: , . f  
,. R - m L I . 8  tk. MMitmy ~ a n i i e s 9 ~  ' klpmt deal oft .&a be@- 
the k t  grand strategy for the 
f an a!lSceptca military doctrSglb 
espiecw in weapons resem~h 
h heat of tbis ria+ would no 
e &at tbe cbltnaq 
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Whatever the specific problem, the central problem is, in any Case, that sure 
and lasting improvement in defense managemefit requires a fundamentally 
new approach. First, any move toward such impro~ement must begin with the 
poEti081 and administrative realities of the world in which the military opera 
at& The frustrations s u f f d  by the military at the hand of Congr~es ,  Sec- 
retaries of Defense, and Presidents have caused the developmm1: of a set of 
defensive attitudes which are the most critical roadblock onthe way to b&Ir 
management. These attitudes cannot be decreed or legislated out of thi! way. 
R&w, r e f d m  should conkentrate initially on new management technique 
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approach henceforth, the coiurtty can encourage their gradual decline. See- 
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large part at least, any initial m e y  Should be carried out by joint teams of 
civilian specialists imd military officer#. If this trim of the problem is corkect, 
any real progress must inevitably be slow. Bht it would seem bettet to be 
satisfied with slow and sure progress than to insist on the technique of t&e 
sudden assault which, on the basis of the record, id highly unlikely to produce 
net benefits. 
I F THE present state of the American defense effort calls for a basic review; if there is need for a clarification of overall strategy, or at least an efficient 
way of dealing with uncertainty; if it is time for a broad-gauged investment 
in scientific and technical training, for a tough-minded appreciation of what 
the economy can stand, and for a realistic approach to the problem of military 
management-there is yet one prerequisite of success ranking above all these. 
This is a new political momentum and vision. And whether or not this momen- 
tum and vision will come forth is, of all the uncertainties with which the 
American defense effort seems to bristle, perhaps the least fathomable. 
What is required is clear enough, and can be put in plain words. To do 
enough for defense under present conditions demands from society a huge 
diversion of efforts which its members, qaturally enough, prefer to devote to 
the pursuit of private ends. It means less consumption and more work, less 
freedom of self-direction and more attention to a part of reality which cannot 
help but induce anxiety. In short, it means giving up a great deal of what is 
worth defending in order to improve the chances of protecting the rest. What 
is at issue, moreover, is not a temporary effort, to win a war or weather a 
single crisis, but a sustained and, seen from the imperfect vantage point of 
the present, an indefinite effort. And this effort must come forth without any- 
one being able to prove compellingly that so much, and no less, is indeed a 
minimum for reasonable security; hence the temptation will always be there 
to do less and hope for the best-a temptation, incidentally, which the Com- 
munist rulers will try to manipulate to their advantage. 
There are pessimistic observers who doubt that democratic societies-and 
especially societies so much given to the search for personal comfort and 
security-are capable of rising to the challenge and bearing the strain indefi- 
nitely. These skeptics fear that the future is with the harsh regimes of the 
Communist Bloc. But it cannot be said that the mettle of the Western nations 
has as yet been tested. The general public in this country, and in the other 
Western countries as well, is not aware of the general nature of the military 
problem confronting them. 
The crucial function is that of political leadership. The security of the West 
may come to be in sorry straits if its leaders yield to the push and pull of a 
public-only partly informed of and, by disposition, largely reluctant to face 
the external danger-and accord to defense only what thought, energy and 
treasure it can spare from its devotion to domestic politics. In such circum- 
stances, Western leaders will not be permitted to demand the necessary sacri- 
fices, and demand these on the basis of a strategy that must cope with un- 
certain knowledge. 
The first prerequisite is for leaders of all kinds-no matter what party, 
interest group and ideological affiliation-to give priority to the job of com- 
ing to grips with the Communist menace in all its forms-military, political, 
technological and economic. And this new momentum among the leaders can 
only spring from a new vision which, at this time of supreme crisis, sees 
external danger and the various means to avert it-science, innovation, eco- 
nomic growth, political responsibility and moral commitment-as an integral 
part of life. Such a vision, the second prerequisite, will give steadiness of pur- 
pose which will do away with the risky dependence on Pearl Harbors, Koreas 
and sputniks for provoking purpose belatedly, with the inefficient cycle of 
complacency and over-reaction, and with the inability to seize the initiative 
instead of merely parrying the initiatives of the opponent. Only such a vision 
will yield a military stature in keeping with the enormity of the danger. 

